Full Committee Hearing - Spent Fuel
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Witness Panel 1
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The Honorable John Ensign
U.S. SenatorWitness Panel 1
The Honorable John Ensign
STATEMENT OF Senator John Ensign
Hearing on S. 2589, the Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act
Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
Thursday, August 3, 2006
Submitted for the Record
I want to thank the Chair, the Ranking, and other members of the Committee for the opportunity to present testimony on S.2589, the Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act.
I find the stated purpose of the bill to be outrageous – considering its content. The stated purpose of this bill is to enhance the management and disposal of nuclear fuel and high level radioactive waste, to ensure protection of public health and safety, and to ensure the territorial integrity and security of the repository at
First, this bill doesn’t enhance the management and disposal of nuclear waste – it simply expedites it. The bill tries to legislate around the scientific and safety flaws of
This legislation does nothing to correct those problems; it merely attempts to circumvent them. In fact, the bill changes the funding mechanism to remove Congressional control and eliminates much needed oversight of how taxpayer dollars are being spent on this project. It also scales back NRC licensing requirements and eliminates regulations with the idea of getting nuclear waste to
Second, this bill doesn’t ensure protection of public health and safety – it erodes it. It undercuts safeguards for both the transportation and storage of nuclear waste, leaving the public more vulnerable than ever. It removes all Department of Transportation (DOT), Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Surface Transportation Board, and state authority over nuclear waste transport so that DOE has sole control over a nuclear transportation scheme of unprecedented magnitude. Shipments of waste would be exempt from present and future DOT safe-routing regulations, from DOT safety regulations, and from NRC safeguards regulations.
Furthermore, the bill would exempt material that is transported or stored in NRC-licensed containers or located at
In February of this year, the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) released its report on the dangers associated with transporting nuclear waste and advocated that states and local governments have a central role in any successful waste transportation program. This legislation directly contradicts that recommendation. It abolishes state, local, and tribal government transportation authority and circumvents involvement from other federal agencies, such as NRC, DOT and the Department of Homeland Security, which is currently called for under exiting law. According to DOE, 45 states, 700 counties, and 50 Native American tribes will be affected by the transport of nuclear waste to
Third, this bill does not ensure the territorial integrity and security of
We need to find another solution to our nuclear waste problem and this legislation is not it. Instead, we need to amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 to require the title to all spent nuclear fuel, stored in dry casks, to be passed to the DOE upon on-site transfer from storage pools to casks. Senator Reid and I introduced legislation to allow the DOE to assume liability of the waste onsite before it is transferred to
The fact remains that if
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The Honorable Harry Reid
United States SenatorWitness Panel 1
The Honorable Harry Reid
STATEMENT OF Senator Harry REID
Hearing on S. 2589, The Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act of 2006
Before the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
Thursday, August 3, 2006
Submitted for the Record
I want to thank the Chair, the Ranking member, and other members of the Committee for the opportunity to present testimony on this issue, which is very important to me, my home State of Nevada, and the rest of the country.
Everyone knows that the proposed
Even the administration knows this is a flawed, dangerous project. We can see this in the bill. It tells you everything that the administration knows is wrong with Yucca. They have sent us this legislation to change the rules, break the law and prevent states from protecting their citizens.
If Yucca were scientifically sound – if it genuinely was a safe place to store nuclear waste – the administration would not need to gut the laws that regulate hazardous waste handling and transportation, clean air, water rights, public land laws, and environmental policy. If Yucca were scientifically sound, the administration would not need to preempt states’ rights.
If Yucca were scientifically sound – if it was genuinely safe – we would not have this bill and we would not be here today.
Let’s be honest, the administration is trying to prevent the states from protecting themselves and their citizens.
It is important to remember that this proposal does not just affect or preempt
If Yucca were scientifically sound and safe, DOE would not need to remove control of the project from the agencies with expertise – the Department of Transportation, Environmental Protection Agency, Bureau of Land Management, Fish and Wildlife Service, and even the Department of Defense.
Do my colleagues on the committee know that this bill subordinates the authority of the Department of Defense to that of the Department of Energy? No longer does DOD get to determine, when, where and how our flights are conducted at Nellis Air Force Base. The administration has determined that DOE will make those decisions for flights over the
We cannot sacrifice our nation’s national security for this short-sighted proposal.
What may be even worse is that Congress is being asked to approve the gutting of all these laws and authorities for a project without any details, with no assurance of its safety, no assurance of its viability, and no assurance of its long-term integrity.
In fact, the administration has not even done the impact analysis of this proposal as required by the National Environmental Protection Act. We’ve been trying to get that analysis and clarification on what the administration is or is not doing, but have been given the runaround.
Maybe that’s partly because DOE does not even have a final design for the facility. That is right – DOE has announced that it is completely redesigning the surface facilities, transportation methods and storage requirements. What are the details? We do not have them.
The truth is – although DOE has never said so – if the Department truly intends to increase the amount of waste that can be stored in the mountain, DOE will have to redesign the facility itself.
They are just saying trust us – do not ask any questions, just trust us.
Trust DOE, the department that has had more than 20 years of quality assurance and control problems on this program, whose contractors have the same problems, both of which ignore them and let them continue? Trust DOE, the agency that does not care that data on water infiltration was falsified?
Trust DOE? I don’t think so.
Let me take a moment and address the USGS incident. DOE likes to make a lot of noise about the fact that the Department of Justice did not bring criminal charges against the employees who falsified the data. But let’s be clear: avoiding criminal indictment is NOT an exoneration.
To meet the high burden of a criminal case, prosecutors would have had to prove that the employees made false statements with deliberate knowledge that the statements were false and that the statements had a material effect on the project.
Of course the employees knew that the statements were false – we know that from their own emails, which have been released. However, prosecutors couldn’t prove that the statements had a material effect on the section of a site that had been selected years before.
So these employees narrowly averted federal felony charges. That does not mean the data is accurate. False data is still false data.
Worst of all, DOE has no intention of redoing the data. The threat of criminal prosecution may have passed, but the threat to public health remains.
It is not surprising.
Ward Sproat, who oversees the
Bechtel – to whom DOE has given bonuses for substandard and incomplete work. Bechtel – the contractor that was under a stop work order because it ignored problems. Bechtel – the same company that ignored problems with the Big Dig, an action that has led to continuing safety problems and, tragically, the death of a motorist from the falling tunnel.
It concerns me that it is Bechtel’s expertise upon which DOE is relying. But it is a metaphor for this entire project.
I have grave reservations about nuclear power primarily because of the problems it generates in terms of spent nuclear fuel storage and transportation, the security and siting of nuclear power plants, and nonproliferation. I would like see these problems solved. I would like for nuclear power to be the panacea that some of my esteemed colleagues see it as.
But nuclear power never will solve any problems unless we address and resolve these problems. That will never happen until we actually look for and find a scientific solution, a real solution, not a political solution, to these issues. I think that we can. I have faith in American ingenuity.
Let’s stop wasting time and money researching and redesigning
What are we to do with the waste in the interim? We leave it on-site in dry cask storage, where it is safely and securely stored now and where the nuclear industry estimates it will continue to be safely stored for decades.
According to the Nuclear Energy Institute, dry cask storage is here to stay. And according to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, it’s safe for one to two hundred years. And, on-site storage saves money. DOE’s last estimate for
As NEI has shown us, with or without Yucca, on-site storage will be widespread. Let’s embrace this option while we search for other alternatives.
We should stop wasting our time and money on
I challenge all my colleagues to sit down with me, as many on both sides of the aisle have already done, and begin discussing a scientifically sound solution to our nuclear waste problems. Let’s take the focus away from this dead project, and find real solutions to secure our energy future.
Witness Panel 2
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The Honorable Edward Sproat
Director, Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste ManagementDepartment of EnergyWitness Panel 2
The Honorable Edward Sproat
Statement of Edward F. Sproat, III
Director for the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management
U.S. Department of Energy
Before the
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources
United States Senate
August 3, 2006
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss S. 2589 entitled the "Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act." Enactment of this bill would significantly enhance the Nation’s ability to manage and dispose of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. I thank the Chairman and Senator Inhofe for taking up the critical issue and introducing the legislation.
Over the last 50 years, our country has benefited greatly from nuclear energy and the power of the atom. We need to ensure a strong and diversified energy mix to fuel our Nation’s economy, and nuclear power is an important component of that mix. Currently more than 50,000 metric tons of spent nuclear fuel is located at more than 100 above-ground sites in 39 states, and every year, reactors in the United States produce an additional approximately 2,000 metric tons of spent fuel. In order to ensure the future viability of our nuclear generating capacity, we need a safe, permanent, geologic repository for spent nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain.
Recently the Department announced its plans to submit a License Application for the repository to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by June 30, 2008, and to initiate repository operations in 2017. This opening date of 2017 is a "best-achievable schedule" and is predicated upon enactment of the pending legislation. This proposed legislation addresses many of the uncertainties that are currently beyond the control of the Department that have the potential to significantly delay the opening date for the repository, and I would like to briefly summarize the bill’s provisions for the Committee.
First, the most important factor in moving the Yucca Mountain Project forward is the ability of the Department to have access to the Nuclear Waste Fund to support the cash flows needed to implement the Project. By making a technical budgetary scoring change, the proposed legislation would correct a structural budget problem that currently prevents use of the Fund as it was intended. This change would allow the Fund to be used to provide consistent and sufficient funding for the construction and operations of the repository. Funding for the Program would still have to be requested by the President and Congressional appropriations from the Fund would still be required.
Second, to meet NRC licensing requirements it will also be necessary for Congress to approve the permanent withdrawal of the lands needed for the operational area of the repository. The bill would withdraw permanently from public use approximately 147,000 acres of land in Nye County, Nevada. The Department is confident that the permanent withdrawal of land would meet the NRC licensing requirement for the Yucca Mountain repository and would help assure protection of public health and the environment.
Third, to promote efficient management and disposal of the current and projected future inventories of commercial spent nuclear fuel located at reactors throughout the United States, the proposed legislation would eliminate the current statutory 70,000 metric ton cap on disposal capacity at Yucca Mountain and allow for maximum use of the mountain’s true technical capacity. By eliminating an artificial statutory limit and allowing NRC to evaluate the actual capacity at Yucca Mountain, this provision would help provide for safe isolation of the Nation’s entire commercial spent nuclear fuel inventory from existing reactors, including life extensions, and may postpone the need for a second repository elsewhere until the next century.
In addition the proposed legislation includes a number of provisions that would promote prompt consideration of issues associated with the Yucca Mountain repository or would address other matters that have the potential to cause delays in moving forward with the Yucca Mountain Project.
First, the proposed legislation contains provisions that would provide for a more streamlined NRC licensing process by amending the licensing process in several respects. In particular, it would make clear that an application for construction authorization need not include information on surface facilities other than those facilities necessary for initial operations. The bill would also establish an expedited one-year schedule and a simplified, informal process for use by the NRC to consider the license amendment for the Department to be able to receive and possess nuclear materials as well as applications for other future license amendment actions. The bill would also direct that the NRC, consistent with other provisions under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, need not consider in its environmental review any actions taken outside of the geologic repository operations area; this will help focus the licensing process.
Second, the proposed legislation would permit early initiation of infrastructure and pre-construction activities at the Yucca Mountain site for utility, communications, and safety upgrades, and the construction of a rail line to connect the Yucca Mountain site with the national rail network. Construction of repository surface and sub-surface nuclear facilities would still require a construction authorization from the NRC.
Third, the proposed legislation includes additional provisions that would simplify the regulatory framework for the repository. In particular, the legislation would designate the Environmental Protection Agency as the appropriate agency to issue, administer, and enforce any air quality permits required in connection with the Yucca Mountain repository. Material owned, transported and stored in NRC-licensed containers and NRC-licensed materials at Yucca Mountain would also be exempt from Federal, State, and local environmental requirements under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.
Fourth, the proposed legislation would address the use of water needed to carry out the authorized functions under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. This legislation would allow the Department to be treated like a private business in requesting water access, resulting in a non-discriminatory treatment of the Department. The State of Nevada would still review and administer water allocation to the Department under this provision.
Fifth, the proposed legislation would address transportation and ensure the expedited movement of shipments to Yucca Mountain. In this regard, the legislation would provide the flexibility for the DOE to regulate the transport of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste to the repository in the same manner that we currently move nuclear weapons. The Department has been transporting such nuclear materials safely for many years. In addressing this issue, we are not proposing to change in any way our route planning activities with State, Tribal and local authorities or how we work with them on emergency planning, training and education. This provision would not affect our longstanding commitment to transporting nuclear material in a manner that meets or exceeds NRC and Department of Transportation requirements for transportation of comparable material. Likewise, it would not affect our longstanding practice of working with State, Tribal and local governments, transportation service providers, and other Federal agencies to utilize their resources and expertise to the maximum extent practicable.
Finally, the proposed legislation would promote the licensing of new nuclear facilities by addressing the need for a regulatory determination of waste confidence by the NRC in connection with proceedings for those new nuclear facilities. This provision directs the Commission to deem that sufficient capacity will be available to dispose of spent nuclear fuel in considering whether to permit the construction and operation of a nuclear reactor or a related facility.
Conclusion
Nuclear power has been demonstrated to be a safe, reliable, and efficient source of power. Enactment of the proposed legislation is necessary to allow the Yucca Mountain Project to move forward and to advance the Nation’s energy independence, energy security, and national security objectives. Mr. Chairman, I look forward to working with you and the Members of this Committee on this legislation to facilitate the construction and operation of the repository and ensuring the continued development of safe, clean, and efficient nuclear power in this country. I would be pleased to answer any questions at this time.
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Martin Virgilio
Deputy Executive Director for Materials, Research, State and Compliance ProgramsU.S. Nuclear Regulatory CommissionWitness Panel 2
Martin Virgilio
STATEMENT SUBMITTED
BY THE
UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION
TO THE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
UNITED STATES SENATE
CONCERNING
S. 2589
NUCLEAR FUEL MANAGEMENT AND DISPOSAL ACT
PRESENTED BY
MARTIN J. VIRGILIO
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR
MATERIALS, RESEARCH, STATE AND COMPLIANCE PROGRAMS
OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR FOR OPERATIONS
Introduction
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, it is a pleasure to appear before you today to discuss S. 2589, the Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act, which has several provisions that affect the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC).
It is important to make clear at the outset that, because of the NRC’s licensing and adjudicatory role in the national repository program, the NRC is not taking a position on most of the provisions in the legislation, which appear to be aimed at facilitating eventual operation of the proposed repository at Yucca Mountain.
However, some of those provisions, if enacted, could adversely impact the NRC’s ability to meet its statutory obligations with respect to radioactive high-level waste. The Commission offers the following comments on provisions in the bill that would affect the timing of the Commission’s review of a Department of Energy (DOE) application for a license to receive and store waste at the proposed Yucca Mountain high-level waste repository. These provisions are the subject of a letter we sent the Committee on June 30, 2006, and the points we are going to make here today are the points that we made in that letter.
Time Needed for Adequate Review
The Commission fully understands the importance of addressing the storage and disposal of high-level radioactive waste in a manner that is both safe and timely. The Commission has a record of moving responsibly and promptly to meet its obligations under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. We continue our preparations for conducting an independent safety review of a Yucca Mountain application. We are confident that we will be ready to receive an application that DOE now says it will submit to us in 2008. We are also confident that we will reach a decision on the application within the time constraints set forth in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act assuming DOE submits a high-quality license application.
At the same time, our long experience in dealing with applications for major nuclear projects has made us keenly aware of the level of effort required to conduct a thorough licensing review that meets our statutory obligations to protect public health and safety, and to promote the common defense and security. Our main concern here is that the NRC be given sufficient time to conduct a comprehensive review of DOE’s applications.
Accordingly, we are concerned with Section 4(b) because it appears to give the NRC insufficient time to review an application to license receipt and possession of waste at the proposed repository. Section 4(b) imposes a 1-year limit (with the possibility of a six-month extension) on the NRC’s licensing decision. This deadline does not appear achievable to us for at least three reasons.
First, the NRC staff’s technical, environmental, and legal reviews are likely to take more than a year, particularly because the staff is almost certain to ask questions about the application, and to ask for additional information in support of the application. Even the staff’s reactor renewal reviews, which are widely recognized as efficient, have required about two years for each application (22-30 months, depending upon whether a hearing is requested and granted), and yet those reviews focus on a relatively narrow range of issues at facilities we have regulated for several decades.
Second, even the informal adjudicatory proceeding called for in the bill would contain certain necessary processes that cannot be carried out quickly. For example, the bill provides for limited discovery; add to this the Commission’s own default proceedings, which, though less formal than trial-type proceedings, nonetheless call for written testimony, allow for questioning by the presiding officer, and allow for appeal of the presiding officer’s decision to the Commission. The NRC cannot complete, in one year, both the staff’s safety review and the adjudicatory proceeding.
Third, another provision in Section 4 might increase the scope of the licensing decision, and thus the time needed to make the decision: Section 4(a) of the bill provides that an application for construction authorization "need not contain information on surface facilities other than surface facilities necessary for initial operation of the repository." This provision might be read simply to place certain surface facilities outside the NRC’s jurisdiction, in which case the provision would reduce the time licensing might take; on the other hand, the provision might be read to provide for staged consideration of surface facilities. Under this latter interpretation, the NRC would review certain facilities as part of its decision on construction authorization, but review others during the later receipt and possession phase, with the result that Section 4(a) would increase the scope of the receipt and possession review, and yet Section 4(b) would decrease the time allowed for that review. The intent of this provision needs to be clarified. Section 4(b) also should be revised to make clear whether the use of informal proceedings in hearings is intended to apply to the multiple amendments to the license to receive and possess that are envisioned with a phased approach for the potential repository.
For these reasons, the NRC would urge that the time for deciding on the application to receive and possess waste be increased to two years after the docketing of the application, with the possibility of an extension of six months.
We appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today, and the Commission looks forward to continuing to work with the Committee on this proposed legislation. We welcome your comments and questions.
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The Honorable David Wright
CommissionerRepresenting SEARUCWitness Panel 2
The Honorable David Wright
UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE DAVID A. WRIGHT
COMMISSIONER,
ON BEHALF OF THE
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS
“S. 2589”
National Association of
Regulatory Utility Commissioners
Telephone (202) 898-2200, Facsimile (202) 898-2213
Internet Home Page http://www.naruc.org
Good Morning Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Bingaman, and Members of the Committee.
My name is
I would like to summarize my testimony and have my full statement entered into the record.
NARUC is a quasi-governmental, non-profit organization founded in 1889. Its membership includes the State public utility commissions serving all States and territories. NARUC’s mission is to serve the public interest by improving the quality and effectiveness of public utility regulation. NARUC’s members regulate the retail rates and services of electric, gas, water, and telephone utilities. We are obligated under the laws of our respective States to ensure the establishment and maintenance of such utility services as may be required by the public convenience and necessity and to ensure that such services are provided under rates and subject to terms and conditions of service that are just, reasonable, and non-discriminatory.
NARUC’s goals in the nuclear waste area are well known and have been stated before this and other Congressional committees on a number of prior occasions. NARUC believes that the federal government needs to meet its obligation under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, as amended, to accept spent nuclear fuel from utilities and other nuclear generators in a timely manner. NARUC further believes that the nation’s ratepayers have upheld their end of the bargain struck in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act by providing, either directly or through income generated on prior payments, over $25 billion for use in constructing a nuclear waste repository. Finally, NARUC believes that the Nuclear Waste Fund should only be employed for its intended purpose and that the monies in the Nuclear Waste Fund should be utilized, along with appropriations from the Department of Defense budget, for the sole purpose of supporting the opening of the
Two years ago, the repository program seemed to be very close to having the repository license application completed for submittal to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission during 2004, but was further delayed due to the need for the Environmental Protection Agency to revise the radiation standard to be used in the license review. In addition, there were some difficulties between DOE and the NRC in meeting the documentation certification requirements of the Licensing Support Network (LSN) that many of us outside the government did not fully understand. And there was the revelation that there may have been some records falsification by some employees of the United States Geologic Survey who had worked on the project. Since then, EPA has issued their proposed revised radiation standard and has concluded the public comment period. We don’t know the status of the LSN documentation but the USGS and DOE records investigations seemed to be concluded, with the program scientific work reaffirmed.
NARUC’s primary concern with the civilian radioactive waste management program is for Congress to reform the way the Nuclear Waste Fund is managed and the way in which appropriations are made from the Fund. Reform of the Fund appropriations process is necessary to provide a stable financial footing so that the government can fulfill its statutory and contractual obligation to provide safe disposal of spent nuclear fuel and other high-level radioactive waste as was the intent of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Although the House Energy and Commerce Committee voted favorably on H.R. 3981 in the previous Congress, the bill never made it to a floor vote and no action was taken in the Senate. We did not consider that a perfect bill (it was only for a five year period) but it would have helped ensure that more of the fee revenue collected by the Fund would actually be appropriated for its intended use. While the FY 2006 budget referred to the Administration’s remaining interested in pursuing a similar proposal for reclassification of NWF fees as offsetting collections and discussing it with Congress, no legislation was developed that year.
NARUC’s and State utility regulator’s prime concern for the repository program remains to reform the Nuclear Waste Fund appropriations process. It is difficult for us to see how the repository program can ever shift into an implementation phase when funding requirements would need to increase by orders of magnitude compared with the pre-licensing phase. Simply put, the repository cannot be built without a more stable financing arrangement. Without the repository, spent nuclear fuel continues to accumulate and be stored in places that were never designed or permitted for indefinite storage. Spent fuel would be stored at 72 locations along rivers and lakes in 34 States instead of in a more secure, well-designed repository. Although we see many favorable signs for investment in new nuclear power plants, including provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, we also continue to hear that lack of a clear path towards disposal of spent nuclear fuel may hold back that investment.
We also need reform of the Nuclear Waste Fund because we owe it to the ratepayers who pay the fees in their electric bill. For the past five years, three quarters of the fees collected for nuclear waste disposal have gone to other unrelated federal purposes. In the current fiscal year total fee payments into the Nuclear Waste Fund are expected to be $750 million. That compares with $99 million appropriated for the repository program. All that we as utility regulators can show ratepayers is a financial report from the Department of Energy that there is an account in the Treasury called the Nuclear Waste Fund that supposedly has $18 billion in it for the repository program. It is a cruel fact of life that for all practical purposes those funds are inaccessible or already spent. All the ratepayers want is for the government to remove the spent fuel for disposal as they were promised over 24 years ago would already have begun by now.
We are grateful for the leadership of House Energy and Water Development Appropriations Subcommittee and its unwillingness to simply do nothing last year while the repository license application was delayed and no reform to the Nuclear Waste Fund was in the works. In the markup of the FY 2006 budget, Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman David Hobson sought to add $10 million to initiate an interim storage program using DOE sites that are presumed to already have the security and other support that could accommodate spent fuel from commercial reactors. DOE would take title to and ship utility waste to the unspecified locations that already store similar government radioactive waste. We had many questions about that approach, but it could have been a step in the right direction, especially for spent fuel now stored at 14 shutdown reactor sites. We doubt that any significant quantity could have been moved in FY 2006, as the Subcommittee report indicated, or that much could be done for the $20 million the bill would have appropriated. Of course, when the Senate did not include similar provisions or equal funding, the proposal did not survive in conference.
For FY 2007, the House again took up an interim storage proposal in the appropriations bill, this time adding $30 million, not from the Nuclear Waste Fund, for development of some undetermined amount of interim storage of spent fuel at “integrated spent fuel recycling facilities” that could be serve as a vanguard for demonstration of spent fuel reprocessing under the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative being pursued within DOE as part of the broader Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP.) There was a stipulation in the bill that authorization be obtained for interim storage, since DOE has maintained that it lacked authority to establish interim storage.
Then this Committee released its proposal, which later became Section 313 of the Senate Appropriations Committee markup of the FY 2007 Energy and Water Appropriations Bill (Senate Report 109-274), that calls for DOE to propose “consolidation and preparation facilities” for interim storage of spent fuel in each State with a commercial nuclear reactor or, alternatively, regional CAP facilities. We understood Chairman Domenici wanted to stimulate a dialogue on interim storage and to get States involved. I have been surprised at the muted reactions from many States, who may be tending to more pressing matters like wildfires, budget crises and other issues. I will say this, however: States are involved in nuclear waste storage at reactors. In my State, we have utilities expressing great interest in building new nuclear plants to provide emissions-free reliable baseload power for forecasted energy demand. Yet, the utilities indicate they may have difficulty raising capital without greater certainty on nuclear waste disposal. State utility commissioners are also involved in another way: those utilities making payments into the Nuclear Waste Fund, pass those costs on to their ratepayers. Since 1983, over $900 million has been paid into the Fund from
We have many questions about the CAP proposal. Unless DOE is better staffed than I suspect they are, it would seem unlikely that DOE could undertake a delicate site search concurrently in 31 States within the 270 day timeline. There are environmental impact considerations and the potential for litigation that could slow the process. Are we even sure that every State has a storage deficiency? It is my understanding that once it was apparent that DOE would not meet the 1998 waste acceptance mandate, many utilities resigned themselves to the necessity to develop dry cask storage on-site to supplement pool storage. There is litigation over recoupment of those expenses, but for the active reactors, there has been a steady increase (over 38 so far) of separately licensed dry cask facilities and more are planned. The shutdown plants had little choice but to put their fuel in dry cask storage and some of those sites could stand some relief from continuing to store spent fuel.
Governors will want to know how the site search process within their States will proceed. Some States have restrictions on developing new nuclear facilities within the State and, although the factual record on nuclear waste transportation safety is superb, there is nonetheless public concern over transportation and unease over siting that is not likely assuaged by assurances that the CAP storage would only be for 25 years.
NARUC has supported interim storage away from reactor storage sites for some time, whether by the government or at private facilities provided by the utilities themselves such as proposed at
Also relevant to the use of the Nuclear Waste Fund is the 2002 decision by the Eleventh Circuit of the United States Court of Appeals (Alabama Power, Carolina Light and Power, et al. v. Department of Energy) ruling that the Nuclear Waste Fund may only be used for disposal and an expenditure for interim storage is not an act of disposal.
Last year, the House Appropriations Report (109-086) called for DOE to initiate a plan to begin spent fuel reprocessing (or re-cycling) in FY 2007. Members of the Committee are familiar with the history of reprocessing in this country and the experiences in other countries. We know the 2001 National Energy Plan recommended that the subject be re-visited, and that DOE has an Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative as part of a research effort to look at what to many is an intuitively appealing goal of ‘recycling’ used fuel. Yet technology, economics, environmental and proliferation concerns remain. Testimony by industry and academic experts before the House Science Committee last July also suggested there are many economic and other questions to be addressed. We will leave that for others to sort through, but I want make a single point here: There is no known reprocessing method in use today or possible in the future that does not result in some quantity of high-level radioactive waste that will require disposal in a repository. Therefore, whether we reprocess in this country or not we will still need a repository like
Moreover, the repository design that is being proposed for Yucca Mountain does not preclude a future decision to retrieve any or all spent fuel emplaced in it for reprocessing (or other reasons) until the decision is made to seal the repository, which, according to DOE, could be anywhere from 50 to 300 years in the future. If spent nuclear fuel is indeed an energy asset,
With the FY 2007 Department of Energy Budget, Secretary of Energy Samuel Bodman announced the initiative called the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP.) It has many dimensions and purposes, but one that we are interested in is the suggestion that if advanced forms of reprocessing and recycling of spent nuclear fuel were to be developed under the GNEP vision, that the amount of nuclear waste requiring disposal might be greatly reduced and its radiation characteristics would be hazardous over a much shorter period of time. Naturally, we are interested in learning more about the proposal and its feasibility in terms of achievable technology, economics, environment and non-proliferation considerations. It is too new for us to take a position on the matter until we learn more, but our existing policy remains current. In 2000, we revised our Nuclear Waste Guiding Principles to include: “Reprocessing of spent fuel may be worthy of research, but, even if feasible, does not eliminate the need for a permanent repository.”
Accordingly, we support the research proposed for GNEP and the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative in the FY 2007 DOE budget request. It appears to be a worthwhile investment that could pay dividends down the road while investigating the feasibility of proliferation-resistant reprocessing.
We have been troubled by the legislative proposal to have the Department of Energy take title to spent nuclear fuel at commercial reactor sites and manage it there for some unspecified time, as in S. 2099. We see press reports that the scheme would be financed by the Nuclear Waste Fund and we also interpret the real objective is to somehow—with no clear terminating point—keep the spent fuel where it is instead of building the repository. Obviously, to abandon the repository would require amendment or possibly repeal of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. Proponents of this proposal seem to forget the finding in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act that “Federal efforts during the past 30 years to devise a permanent solution to the problems of civilian radioactive waste disposal have not been adequate.” Instead, they would have us revert to that Square One posture.
We have been careful to avoid any suggestion that continued spent fuel storage at reactor sites is not as safe and secure as the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, which regulates it, maintains that it is, but let us at least suggest that the proposal to have DOE take title and manage spent fuel at present reactor storage sites is not consistent with the “compelling national interests” that former Secretary of Energy Spencer Abraham referred to when he recommended Yucca Mountain as a suitable repository site to the President and Congress in 2002. He said, and we agree, that the repository is important to homeland security.
We strongly oppose the suggestion that the government take title to spent fuel which would remain at 72 reactor sites instead of going to a repository. That is not what was promised in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and reaffirmed by joint resolution in 2002 and it is most certainly not what ratepayers have paid $25 billion in fees and interest over the past 22 years to achieve.
Before I conclude, there is one other item to discuss. We urge strong leadership on the part of the Department of Energy and its support contractors to keep this much-delayed repository program moving forward. We have expressed our frustrations in the past with the chronic underfunding and series of delays that have troubled the program. DOE needs to work its way through whatever else needs to be done to put the repository licensing back on course. We commend the positive spirit and determination of Mr. Edward Sproat, the new director of the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management, when he announced the revised schedule last month and we wish him and the repository team well in meeting that schedule. We appreciate EPA meeting the challenge of responding to the court remand with its proposed revised radiation standard. Although we disagreed with extending the regulatory period to one million years, EPA did meet the mandate of the court and it is time to issue the final rule. We have been aware that during the license application delay, DOE has been conducting a re-examination of repository plans. We saw some of the results of what is termed “program re-direction” in a press release last October. A change in approach was described as being “simpler, safer and more cost-effective,” mostly as a result of a shift to standardized spent fuel canisters that will allow significant changes in fuel handling at the receipt facilities at Yucca Mountain. We certainly applaud cost savings, improved safety and the prospect of reducing the licensing complexity, but we have two concerns that we want to pursue:
1. Will these changes further delay the license application and how will that affect eventual repository operational dates? The schedule announced last month showing initial waste disposal in 2017 is predicated on a number of variables including adequate funding.
2. How will DOE and the utilities be able to ensure that all spent fuel presently stored at reactor sites (up to the current planned amount of 63,000 metric tons) will be able to be transferred into the standardized canisters? Spent fuel is increasingly being stored in sealed canisters in dry casks that will either have to be accepted as is or have the contents transferred to the standard canisters.
Finally, NARUC has not taken any strong position on the other elements of the proposed Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act, aside from our support for the Nuclear Waste Fund reclassification proposal. In general, we find the other provisions to be helpful for the overall goal of licensing, building and operating the repository. We agree that the 70,000 metric ton statutory limit on the repository capacity is arbitrary and the proposal to have the capacity be among the elements of the license review by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission makes sense. We have always urged DOE to plan and eventually conduct the spent fuel transportation in cooperation with other federal, State, tribal and local governments and, to the best of our knowledge the Department is planning to do that as required by the NWPA and as has been done successfully in previous nuclear waste shipments.
Let me summarize what we support:
1. Reform of the Nuclear Waste Fund so that collected fees are available for their intended purpose, as proposed in S. 2589.
2. DOE needs to press on with licensing the
3. Central interim storage away from reactor sites that does not interfere with developing the repository.
4. Research of advanced reprocessing and further study of all aspects of the GNEP initiative.
5. Infusing a sense of urgency in spent fuel repository development.
And, let me summarize what we are strongly oppose:
1. Continued diversion of the Nuclear Waste Fund fee payments.
2. Having DOE take title of spent fuel at reactor storage sites and to retain it there.
3. Use of the Nuclear Waste Fund for interim storage, certainly not so long as appropriations for interim storage would come at the expense of adequate appropriations for the repository
4. Putting as many as 31 States through a concurrent site search for interim storage before the costs and benefits of the proposed “consolidation and preparation” facilities have been determined.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify before you today. I look forward to your questions.
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J. Barney Beasley
President and Chief Executive OfficerSouthern Nuclear CompanyWitness Panel 2
J. Barney Beasley
Testimony
of
J. Barnie Beasley Jr.
President of Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Before the
Energy and Natural Resources Committee
United States Senate
Washington, D.C.
August 3, 2006
Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, my name is Barnie Beasley. I am President and Chief Executive Officer of Southern Nuclear Operating Company. I also serve on the Executive Committee of the Nuclear Energy Institute. I have attached a brief resumé to my testimony as Exhibit 1. Thank you for this opportunity to express the nuclear energy industry’s strong support of S. 2589, the Nuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act. I will also address additional provisions that we believe would strengthen the legislation’s role to enhance the management and disposal of used nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, to ensure protection of public health and safety, to ensure the territorial integrity and security of the repository at Yucca Mountain.
Southern Nuclear is headquartered in Birmingham, Alabama, and is a subsidiary of Southern Company. Southern Company is a public utility holding company with its principal office in Atlanta, Georgia. In addition to Southern Nuclear, Southern Company is the corporate parent of five electric utilities: Alabama Power Company, Georgia Power Company, Gulf Power Company, Mississippi Power Company, as well as Southern Power Company and Southern Company Services, Inc. Southern Company’s subsidiaries provide reliable and affordable electric service to 4.2 million retail and wholesale customers across the southeastern United States.
Southern Nuclear is the licensed operator of the Alvin W. Vogtle Electric Generating Plant and the Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant, which are both two-unit nuclear plants partially owned by Georgia Power Company, and the Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant, which is a two-unit nuclear plant owned by Alabama Power Company. The six nuclear units operated by Southern Nuclear comprise over 6000 megawatts of generating capacity and represent approximately 17% of the total annual generation of the Southern Company system. Both Plants Hatch and Farley have extended their operating licenses for 20 years. The application for the extension of Plant Vogtle’s operating license will be filed with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) next year. These plants provide our customers with reliable and reasonably priced electric energy.
Southern Nuclear will file an application for an Early Site Permit this month in order to determine the suitability of the Vogtle site for potentially two additional nuclear units at Plant Vogtle and is on a schedule to submit an application for a Combined Operating License (“COL”) by early 2008.
Summary
In keeping with the scope of this hearing, I will focus my testimony on the following key issues:
§ The Department of Energy (DOE) must make visible and measurable progress in implementing an integrated national used nuclear fuel management strategy. The Yucca Mountain, Nevada, repository is a critical component of any such integrated strategy. This progress will help ensure that the expanded use of nuclear energy will play a key role in our nation’s strategy for meeting growing electricity demand.
§ The key role that S. 2589 can play in establishing a solid basis for making the necessary progress towards addressing the challenges facing the Yucca Mountain project, as well as helping set the stage for new nuclear plants.
§ Additional legislative provisions that we urge the Committee to consider supplementing the solid foundation established in S. 2589. The federal government must initiate actions that will lead to beginning to remove used fuel from commercial nuclear plant sites as soon as possible.
Nuclear Energy Must Play a Key Role in Our Energy Future
In the 2006 State of the Union address, President Bush affirmed the nation’s commitment to “safe, clean nuclear energy” as part of a diverse portfolio that will meet America’s future electricity needs. A long-term commitment to nuclear energy will make the United States more energy independent and energy efficient. The Administration and Congress demonstrated strong leadership by enacting the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which encourages diversity of energy sources, including emission-free sources of electricity, such as nuclear energy.
Based on many years of experience in operating nuclear power plants, I am convinced that nuclear power offers a clean and cost-effective answer to many of our nation’s current and future energy needs. Although our nation must continue to employ a mix of fuel sources for generating electricity, it is important that nuclear energy maintain at least the current 20 percent contribution to U.S. electricity production. Maintaining that level of production will require construction of a significant number of new nuclear plants beginning in the next decade.
There is strong, bipartisan support for a continuing significant role for nuclear power. More than two thirds of the public supports keeping nuclear energy as a key component of our energy portfolio. The industry appreciates the recognition of nuclear energy’s importance that Congress and the Administration demonstrated in the last year’s comprehensive Energy Policy Act of 2005.
Recently, a new coalition of diverse organizations and individuals has been formed to educate the public on nuclear energy and participate in policy discussions on U.S. energy issues. The Clean and Safe Energy coalition, co-chaired by Greenpeace co-founder Patrick Moore and former Environmental Protection Agency Administrator Christine Todd Whitman, includes business, environmental, labor, health and community leaders among its more than 200 members.
The Need for Legislative Action.
In order to fully realize the benefits that nuclear power offers, however, a solution for the problem of disposal of used nuclear fuel must be found. Since the enactment of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, the customers of Alabama and Georgia Power Companies have paid over $ 897 million into the Nuclear Waste Fund. In total, rate payers across America have paid over $ 27 billion into the Nuclear Waste Fund, and continue to pay an additional $ 750 million each year. Yet, no used fuel has been removed from reactor sites as required by the NWPA. Moreover, those same customers have had to finance costly on-site storage facilities. Southern has had to construct two such facilities to date.
The causes for the failure of the federal used nuclear fuel program to date are well documented. The fundamental problem with the failure of the federal government to remove used fuel from our plant sites has not been the lack of authorizing legislation. It has been the failure to implement the legislation that has been enacted for almost 25 years by appropriating sufficient funds and by a consistent commitment to execute plans to develop the repository. While new legislation to amend the Nuclear Waste Policy Act is important, it is even more critical that the federal government commit itself to the implementation of existing law.
The nuclear industry is encouraged by the ambitious schedule announced by DOE on July 19, 2006, for submission of the license application by June 30, 2008, and the “Best-Achievable” construction schedule that could have the repository begin receipt of used fuel in March 2017. The industry encourages DOE to submit the application as soon as possible so NRC review can begin.
While DOE’s announcement of a schedule for licensing the repository is a significant development, past experience suggests that the schedule will be difficult to achieve without congressional action in a number of areas:
• The Congress providing appropriations consistent with Administration requests;
• An NRC construction authorization decision consistent with the timelines contained in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act;
• Obtaining any necessary Federal or state authorizations or permits for the repository and the transportation system; and
• The DOE achieving a nuclear culture consistent with that needed to be a successful NRC licensee.
Enactment of the Nuclear Fuel Management Disposal Act, S. 2589, will help advance several of these important objectives.
S. 2589 Supports the Future Role for Nuclear Power in our National Energy Strategy
Waste Confidence Is Affirmed
The nation’s policymakers must be confident that policies are in place to ensure the safe and secure storage and disposal of used nuclear fuel. This waste confidence determination is reflected in NRC rules that support various licensing actions. Section 9 of S. 2589 takes the very important step of codifying the waste confidence rule. This will help to avoid potential contentions in individual plant licensing proceedings over the timing and certainty of the performance by DOE of its responsibilities under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. We strongly support this important step in creating certainty for major new investments by the nuclear industry in response to Congress’s Energy Policy Act of 2005.
Managing the nation’s used fuel is a firmly established federal obligation and, as such, is a matter of broad national policy. There is solid scientific and technical justification to affirm waste confidence. In 2001, the National Academy of Sciences confirmed four decades of international scientific consensus that geologic disposal is the best method for managing used nuclear fuel. Congress approved a geologic disposal site at Yucca Mountain in 2002.
In the Energy Policy Act, Congress included provisions that encourage the construction of new nuclear power plants, illustrating confidence in the nation’s ability to manage used reactor fuel in the future. In addition, DOE has safely operated a geologic disposal site for transuranic radioactive waste near
Issues regarding the timing and certainty of performance by DOE of its used fuel management obligations should be resolved in proceedings on the repository, or in Congress. Litigation of such issues in individual plant licensing proceedings is neither efficient nor appropriate. NRC has long recognized that individual plant licensing proceedings should not be burdened with debates over DOE's development of the repository. Congress should codify “waste confidence” as called for in S. 2589, so that the NRC need not address this broad public policy matter in routine licensing proceedings.
Artificial Constraints on Repository Operations Are Eliminated
Currently, there is a statutory limit of 70,000 metric tons (MT) on the amount of nuclear waste materials that can be accepted at Yucca Mountain. The Environmental Impact Statement for the project analyzed emplacement of up to 105,000 MTs of commercial used fuel in the repository. Additional scientific analyses suggest significantly higher capacity could easily be achieved with changes in the repository configuration that use only geology that has already been characterized and do not deviate from existing design parameters. Advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies could provide significant additional capacity for disposing of waste products in Yucca Mountain.
Decisions on licensing and operations of a deep geologic repository at Yucca Mountain should be based on scientific and engineering considerations through DOE technical analyses and the NRC licensing process, not on artificial constraints. Given the decades of study and the billions of dollars invested in Yucca Mountain, it makes sense that we fully and safely utilize its potential capacity, rather than developing multiple repositories when there is no technical reason to do so. S. 2589 will allow the nation to do just that by lifting the artificial 70,000 MT capacity limit.
S. 2589 Includes Key Provisions for Yucca Mountain Progress
Offsetting Collections Reclassification Will Enhance Funding Predictability
Congress established the Nuclear Waste Fund to cover costs associated with disposal of commercial used nuclear fuel. This fund is paid for by a one-tenth-of-a-cent-per-kilowatt-hour fee on electricity used by consumers of nuclear energy. Congress has routinely failed to appropriate to the repository program the total fees paid into the Waste Fund in that year. Further, restrictions on the federal budget have prevented fees collected, but not appropriated, in one year from being appropriated in subsequent years.
As a result, Yucca Mountain budget requests have been cut by more than $1 billion over the last decade. Program funding requirements are forecast to increase substantially over the next few years. If overall spending totals remain flat, even more significant delays could result, not because nuclear power consumers have not provided the funds necessary to support the program, but because of inappropriate federal budget accounting.
To date, consumers of nuclear power have committed more than $27 billion in fees and accrued interest into the fund, and continue to pay at a rate of $750 million each year. However, only some $9 billion has been spent on the project, leaving a balance in excess of $18 billion. In recent years, fee income has been five times as high as annual spending from the fund.
It is my understanding that S. 2589 would reclassify prospective annual fees so that appropriations up to the full amount of fee revenues for any year would not be limited by discretionary spending caps. While this approach would be a major step forward, we believe that the Congress should also reaffirm the compact with ratepayers in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act and provide that any appropriation for the program could be offset by balances in the Nuclear Waste Fund whether derived from prospective fees or past fees and interest.
In addition, we believe it is important for the Congress to act to maintain the integrity of the Nuclear Waste Fund. We support amending S. 2589 to clearly define that only activities that directly contribute to meeting the federal government’s obligation under the NWPA can be supported from the Nuclear Waste Fund. This includes expenditures related to transportation, storage, and disposal of used fuel and high-level waste.
Advanced research on energy technologies has consistently been funded through general revenues, and there is no reason research on advanced fuel processing nuclear technologies – such as those contemplated under the President’s Global Nuclear Energy partnership program – should be financed any differently.
Also, Congress should reaffirm its authority over any changes in the Nuclear Waste Fee by requiring such changes be made by statutory amendment.
S. 2589 will Enhance Clarity and Stability in the Licensing Process
The NRC repository licensing process should be restructured to ensure that the proceedings are prioritized. First, there must be a reasonable, but finite, schedule for review of the authority to “receive and possess” fuel that would follow approval of the construction license. This would be consistent with an established schedule for the initial review of the construction license application and could avoid dilatory procedural challenges that would undermine the government’s ability to meet its contractual obligations and avoid the significant costs of delay.
Second, clarification must be provided as to what activities are authorized to develop used fuel management infrastructure prior to the NRC granting a construction license, including the construction of a rail line to connect the Yucca Mountain site with the national rail network. Regulatory authority for the transportation system needs to be clarified as well.
Third, the hearing process for the authorization to receive and possess fuel should be simplified to provide for clear and concise decision making.
Finally, clarification is needed with respect to land management, what regulations will apply to repository construction and operations, and which agencies will administer those regulations.
S. 2589 addresses each of these issues to increase the prospect that the “best achievable” schedule announced by DOE can be met.
Congress Should Consider Additional Steps to Promote Comprehensive Used Nuclear Fuel Management
While industry fully supports S. 2589 and believes its enactment would be a major milestone in implementing our national strategy for managing used nuclear fuel, we believe there are a number of additional issues that Congress should consider in comprehensive legislation.
DOE Should Move Used Nuclear Fuel from Reactor Sites As Soon As Possible
The industry’s top priority is for the federal government to meet its statutory and contractual obligation to move used fuel away from operating and decommissioned reactor sites. The government already is eight years in arrears in meeting this obligation, and it will be at least another decade before the repository is completed. That failure is the subject of more than 60 lawsuits. These lawsuits potentially expose the federal government to billions of dollars of judgments and settlements.
Further delays in federal receipt and movement of used nuclear fuel and defense waste products will only add to utility damage claims, and, according to DOE, will increase taxpayer liability for defense waste site life-cycle costs and
While DOE moves forward to license, construct and operate the Yucca Mountain repository, the government must take title to used fuel and move it to secure federal facilities as soon as practicable. A number of proposals have been made to address the issue of “interim storage.”
The best approach would be for the federal government to begin to move fuel in proximity to the planned repository. Both House and Senate appropriations bills for FY 2007 have provided direction on this issue. While there is clear interest in looking at options for early movement of fuel, none of the options has yet demonstrated that it is politically and technically workable and could be accomplished in a timely manner. A cooperative and supportive host site is critical to meeting these criteria.
It appears that one or two interim storage sites that provide benefits desired by the host state and community are the appropriate approach. Industry experience demonstrates that such facilities can be sited, licensed, and constructed on an expedited schedule. We are encouraged that DOE has advised the Congress, in its solicitation for prospective sites for nuclear fuel recycling facilities, that there will of necessity be some interim storage of used nuclear fuel involved. A number of communities have expressed initial interest in participating in such a project. We believe Congress should work with DOE, industry and potential host sites to determine what steps will best facilitate the movement of used fuel from utility sites, and incorporate appropriate provisions into S. 2589.
The industry does not believe that the “take title” approach suggested in S. 2099 either meets the federal obligation or provides any benefit. The requirement in that legislation that all used fuel at reactor sites be moved immediately into dry cask storage could add up to $800 million a year over five years to the costs of producing nuclear energy. Regardless of the interim storage strategy chosen, it is critical that those activities not divert attention and resources from repository development.
New Reactor Waste Disposal Contract Issues Need to Be Addressed
As utilities prepare to license and construct new nuclear power plants, it is important that appropriate changes be made in the Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste originally established by rulemaking (10 CFR, Part 961) to reflect developments since these contracts were originally drafted in the 1980s. While the language in both the NWPA and disposal contracts allows for an existing contract to be amended adding new plants, DOE’s failure to perform, and the subsequent litigation, has created a situation where this option may be difficult to execute. Instead, the preferred path forward would be to enact legislation directing DOE to enter into new disposal contracts for new nuclear plants that are consistent in form and substance with the existing disposal contracts, but which take into account the schedule for the operation of new plants. In particular, the 1998 deadline in the existing contracts should be revised in contracts executed for new plants.
The Congress should also consider steps that could facilitate early resolution of future claims by utilities against the federal government for its continuing failure to meet its obligations under the NWPA.
The
As provided by existing regulations, Congress should direct DOE to incorporate features into its repository development plans that maintain flexibility for future generations to make informed decisions based on operational experience, changing energy economics, and technological developments. It should be made clear that it was always the intent that the repository design retains the ability to monitor and, if needed or desired, retrieve the used fuel.
The nuclear energy industry supports enhancements to the Yucca Mountain repository that would provide greater long-term assurance of safety and permit DOE to apply innovative technology at the repository as it is developed. These enhancements include:
· extensive monitoring of the used nuclear fuel placed in the repository and its effects on the surrounding geology for 300 or more years;
· the ability to retrieve the used nuclear fuel from the facility for an extended period; and
· periodic review of updates to the repository license that takes into account monitoring results and ensures that the facility is operating as designed.
DOE already has committed to facilitate the use of these elements in its repository planning For a period of 50 to 300 years, the federal government will “collect, evaluate and report on data” to assess the performance of the repository and the ability to retrieve the used fuel within the facility, if desired. In addition to monitoring material within the facility, DOE will conduct tests and analyses to ensure that the repository is constructed and operated according to strict guidelines. Although DOE is pursuing these elements, Congressional direction on the proposed enhancements would provide greater certainty on the scientific and regulatory oversight of long-term repository operation and the condition of the material stored there.
Doing so would require no modification to the existing federal statutory or regulatory framework. DOE could include these enhancements as part of its “receive and possess” application and the commitment to complete them should be incorporated as a condition of the NRC license.
This direction will offer greater assurance to the public that long-term stewardship of used fuel at Yucca Mountain will be carefully monitored throughout repository operation. It would also allow DOE to take advantage of future technological innovations to improve the repository or provide for the potential reuse of the energy that remains in the fuel.
Used Nuclear Fuel Recycling
The nuclear energy industry has shown consistent and strong support for research and development of advanced fuel cycle technologies incorporated in the Advanced Fuel Cycle Initiative (AFCI). In anticipation of a major expansion of nuclear power in the United States and globally, it is appropriate to accelerate activities in this program. The resurgence in development of nuclear energy is expected to require advanced fuel cycles. However, a repository will be necessary to handle defense wastes, legacy commercial used nuclear fuel, and waste by-products regardless of which fuel cycle is ultimately developed.
President Bush has presented a compelling vision for a global nuclear renaissance through the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership (GNEP). This initiative provides an important framework to satisfy U.S. and world needs for an abundant source of clean, safe nuclear energy while addressing challenges related to fuel supply, long-term radioactive waste management, and proliferation concerns. It may be possible that currently available technologies could be used creatively to jump-start the development of the needed advanced nuclear fuel cycle technologies.
We recognize that the Congress has important questions regarding this program. DOE’s near-term focus for GNEP is to determine, by 2008, how to proceed with demonstration of advanced recycling technologies and other technological challenges. Consequently, the industry fully supports increased funding for AFCI in fiscal 2007. However, neither AFCI nor GNEP, reduces the near-term imperative to develop the
A Constructive Role for Nevadans
The nuclear energy industry supports an active and constructive role for Nevada in the development of Yucca Mountain to help ensure the safety of its citizens. The industry also supports compensation for the State to account for the program’s socioeconomic impact, as called for in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. This model is consistent with the siting and operation of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant.
The industry is encouraged by the steps DOE has taken to work with affected local governments in the State, and we further encourage DOE to expand its interactions with Nevadans interested in constructive engagement in the project. The industry urges the Congress to include provisions in S. 2589 to foster these developments.
Conclusion
We must never lose sight of the federal government’s responsibility for civilian used nuclear fuel disposal, as stated by Congress in the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 and the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982. The industry fully supports the fundamental need for a repository so used nuclear fuel and the byproducts of the nation’s nuclear weapons program are safely and securely managed in a specially designed, underground facility. World-class science has demonstrated that Yucca Mountain is an eminently suitable site for such a facility.
A viable used fuel management strategy is necessary to retain long-term public confidence in operating existing nuclear power plants and in building new nuclear power plants to meet our nation’s growing electricity needs, and to fuel our economic growth. The public confidence necessary to support construction of new nuclear plants is linked to successful implementation of an integrated national used fuel policy, which includes a continued commitment for the long-term disposition of used nuclear fuel. This requires a commitment from the Administration, Congress, and other stakeholders to ensure that DOE makes an effective transition from a scientific program to a licensing and construction program, with the same commitment to safety. New waste management approaches, including interim storage and nuclear fuel recycling, are consistent with timely development of Yucca Mountain.
Enactment of S. 2589 is the critical pre-requisite to implementing our national policy for used fuel management.
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Robert Loux
Executive DirectorAgency for Nuclear Projects, Office of the Governor, State of NevadaWitness Panel 2
Robert Loux
STATEMENT OF ROBERT R. LOUX
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR
NEVADA AGENCY FOR NUCLEAR PROJECTS
OFFICE OF THE GOVERNOR
BEFORE THE UNITED STATES SENATE
COMMITTEE ON ENERGY AND NATURAL RESOURCES
AUGUST 3, 2006
I am Robert Loux, Executive Director of the Nevada Agency for Nuclear Projects. The Agency was established in 1985 by the Nevada Legislature to carry out the State=s oversight duties under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.
We have reviewed the provisions of the bill S. 2589 entitled ANuclear Fuel Management and Disposal Act.@ It is a most extraordinary piece of proposed legislation, even when viewed in the highly politicized and conflict-laden context of the past nineteen years of this nation=s high-level nuclear waste disposal program. During that time we have witnessed the unraveling of the scientific screening and characterization of candidate repository sites, as set out in the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982, to be replaced with the unabashed, politically driven naming of
We have seen Congress prohibit the study of crystalline rock sites for a potential repository in order to avoid the brewing political turmoil over siting a second repository in any of the populous states of the northern mid-west and the eastern seaboard, where a large number of the nation=s nuclear power reactors are located.
The 1992 Energy Policy Act was Congress= rescue vehicle for the
DOE=s site recommendation guidelines and NRC=s licensing rule were adjusted to assure the site would not be disqualified for specific technical safety deficiencies.
And, in 2002, the Secretary of Energy recommended, the President approved, and Congress designated the
Now you have before you a bill that attempts, like a cowcatcher on a locomotive, to anticipate and sweep aside every potential health and safety obstacle that could upset the relentless drive to begin receiving highly radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain in 2017 – eleven years from now. (Ironically, in 1987, when Congress singled out Yucca Mountain, in an attempt to anticipate and fix the burgeoning waste program problems, the planned opening date also was then eleven years in the future - in 1998.) The bill is so dismissive of American democratic values that it is not worthy of this Committee=s or the Congress= consideration.
Removal of potential health and safety obstacles to expedite licensing and operation of a Yucca Mountain repository does nothing to advance the primary safety finding of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act: Ahigh-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel have become major subjects of public concern, and appropriate precautions must be taken to ensure that such waste and spent fuel do not adversely affect the public health and safety and the environment for this or future generations.@ (Sec. 111(a)(7)). Each of the historical actions noted above has resulted in incremental reductions of safety (and increased risk) in the national nuclear waste program. This bill before you today is a continuation of that trend to the extent that it weakens or eliminates regulatory processes and controls, both for the repository and in the nuclear waste transportation arena.
RCRA Exemption
Exempting waste transportation, storage, and disposal from the requirements of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and relying, instead, on regulations adopted under the Atomic Energy Act is an unprecedented compromise of well-understood, long-held and accepted protection of the public from the risks of hazardous materials in the environment. This is a step backward, away from the accepted policy. The Department of Energy=s activities associated with hazardous materials are currently subject to external environmental regulatory oversight, more comprehensive in scope than that afforded under the Atomic Energy Act. This bill=s provision would allow the unprecedented release of hundreds of millions of pounds of hazardous chromium, molybdenum, vanadium, and nickel into the currently potable groundwater supply without any regulatory review. The amount of hazardous metals released would vastly increase if the repository’s nuclear waste capacity limit was lifted, as proposed by this bill.
Transportation Preemptions
The Secretary of Energy should not be permitted to exempt waste transportation to the repository from external regulation. Also, the Secretary should not be given the ability to take the initiative in preempting State, local, and Indian tribal transportation requirements Airrespective of whether the transportation otherwise is or would be subject to regulation under the Hazardous Materials Transportation Authorization Act of 1994.@ These provisions severely compromise these entities= ability to be informed and knowledgeable of sources of risk passing through their jurisdictions and take measures required of public officials to protect public safety. They constitute an unnecessary and undesirable trading of public safety for an unspecified increase in convenience for the Department of Energy. They also ignore a recent National Academy of Sciences study that found, in part, that nuclear waste transportation can be acceptably safe if all existing regulatory requirements are rigorously enforced.
NRC Licensing and EIS
The bill mandates both substantive and procedural measures for the NRC license application and review process that curtail the existing rights of parties to review a complete application and take part in an adjudicatory hearing of the entirety of the proposed project. Permission to limit the information in the application for construction authorization to Asurface facilities necessary for initial operation of the repository,@ coupled with the elimination of formal proceedings for license amendments following the construction authorization, greatly inhibits the ability of parties to participate in a comprehensive safety review of the facility.
Furthermore, any Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) written to accompany a construction authorization decision will be insufficient in its required description of the project and evaluation of potential impacts if the complete planned surface facility and its operations are not available for analysis. The surface facility design concept is currently undergoing a major revision because of operational safety concerns that could not be mitigated. This provision allowing the complete surface facility design and operation to avoid full formal safety review during initial licensing proceedings invites unknown future safety and operational issues to arise, putting the public and workers at increased risk.
State Delegated Authorities
State Groundwater Authority
The bill usurps the State=s traditional authority to administer its waters by commandeering the State to grant extraordinary rights to the Department of Energy. The State’s constitutional authority and implementing laws, under which the State Engineer makes water appropriation decisions, are ignored when the bill declares that the Department=s use of any amount of water it decides is necessary for the Yucca Mountain project is beneficial to interstate commerce, and not detrimental to the public interest. The commandeering of the State Engineer=s authority would extend to water needed for the proposed rail line which, in some places, passes through basins where the safe yield of the groundwater is already fully appropriated. The Department, under this bill, would have no obligation to protect the water resources of the State
Land Withdrawal, Land Use and Air Space Issues
The proposed withdrawal of 147,000 acres (approximately 230 square miles) of land for the
The proposed withdrawal unnecessarily limits public entry and use of current
The bill also gives the Secretary of Energy the authority to close airspace over the repository withdrawal area, despite any objection from the Secretary of the Air Force, whose aircraft currently use the airspace for thousands of training missions each year, with the frequency of use expected to increase in future years. The Air Force Secretary already has objected to any
And, the withdrawal would give the Department authority to exchange land within the withdrawal for federal land outside the withdrawal. With the various limitations for use of withdrawal lands, if exchanges were made to acquire land for the rail access line, this could greatly disrupt, without recourse, public use and access to lands currently used for grazing, mining and mineral exploration, and recreation.
Pre-License Construction
The bill=s provisions for infrastructure improvement and construction prior to NRC construction authorization are also premature and imprudent. The Department recently has released for review and comment, an Environmental Assessment outlining the six new buildings and many miles of new road and electrical power line construction and replacement, it plans over a two year period prior to construction authorization. In the EA, the Department claims the approximately $100 million worth of new and replacement construction is not intended to support repository construction and operation, yet the bill gives a green light for just that purpose, even though, according to the Department=s recently announced plans, the anticipated construction authorization is just five years away. Without a construction authorization from the NRC, the proposed new and replacement construction is not needed, not authorized by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and certainly not prudent, despite the thin claims in the EA that it will improve safety for workers, visitors, and regulators, and support continuing scientific work and testing.
Program Funding
Opening the annual receipts of the Nuclear Waste Fund as discretionary offsetting collections to fund the program is not an entirely new concept. Well over a decade ago, then Energy Secretary Hazel O=Leary made the plea to Congress, AUntie my hands,@ when seeking full access to the Nuclear Waste Fund. Since that time, we all have come to see that full access to the waste fund would not have been the solution to the problems that the program has inflicted on itself, and are beyond the scope of the anticipated and potential problems that this bill seeks to sweep aside.
Quality Assurance
Throughout its history, the inability of the program to implement a satisfactory quality assurance program has been chronicled by the General Accounting Office (now Government Accountability Office) and the NRC, yet to date the problems persist. But, according to Department managers, as always, they are on the verge of being solved. Quality assurance failures were at the core of the now infamous e-mail incident whose fallout has caused millions of dollars of expense and immeasurable loss of credibility that still is ongoing. Open access to the Nuclear Waste Fund would not have provided an obvious solution to the persistent quality assurance failures. Instead, the Department sees it as a Aculture@ issue and is now (after more than 20 years) claiming to be implementing measures to make individual managers more accountable for their work and the work they supervise. In the licensing proceeding, the Department must demonstrate that it has management systems in place and functioning that would support an NRC finding that the Department would be a qualified and competent licensee. The Department itself does not seem to believe that it yet passes this test, but is confident that it will by the time of license application.
Concluding Remarks
The many provisions of this bill that are aimed at eliminating administrative and regulatory requirements the Department perceives as obstacles to meeting its latest schedule for opening a Yucca Mountain repository have the appearance of being a litany of excuses for continued poor performance. Virtually all of the issues raised in the bill involve actions that are outside of the control of the Department. Yet the real obstacles that the Department must deal with are of it own making. A most telling example was the Department=s inability to comply with the NRC=s requirement to provide an adequate and acceptable documentary record to support its then-anticipated 2004 license application. The Department=s recently announced fantasy schedule calls for its next effort to provide such a record to take place on December 21, 2007, providing just a few days more than the required six months prior to submitting a repository license application, which is scheduled by the Department for June 30, 2008.
None of the provisions of S. 2589 are needed by the Department of Energy to carry out the primary task at hand - prepare a complete, high quality license application and submit it to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for review and hearing. This bill gathers the powers of numerous federal and state agencies, local authorities, and Indian tribes into the hands of the Department of Energy, probably the most distrusted federal agency in the human health and environmental arena. It boldly does this for the sole purpose of attempting to force a faltering
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Geoff Fettus
EsquireNatural Resources Defense Council
